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Abstract The Islamist movement in Turkey bases its mobilization strategy on
transforming everyday practices. Public challenges against the state do not form a
central part of its repertoire. New Social Movement theory provides some tools for
analyzing such an unconventional strategic choice. However, as Islamist mobiliza-
tion also seeks to reshape the state in the long run, New Social Movement theory
(with its focus on culture and society and its relative neglect of the state) needs to be
complemented by more institutional analyses. A hegemonic account of mobilization,
which incorporates tools from theories of everyday life and identity-formation, as
well as from state-centered approaches, is offered as a way to grasp the complexity
of Islamism.
How do movements generate power? Can we talk about a social movement in
the absence of contentious politics? How can a movement win the hearts and
minds of a population even when it avoids challenging authorities? When we
think of social movements, we tend to invoke images of rallies, demonstrations,
strikes, and street action that challenge the state (McAdam 1988; Piven and
Cloward 1977; Tilly 1978). Here, I draw attention to another kind of movement
activity.
In Turkey, the Islamist movement generally shies away from challenging the state
directly and usually avoids noisy protest. Why don’t Islamists in Turkey directly
attack secular authorities? How do they sustain mobilization under unfavorable
circumstances?
Unlike the other established perspectives in social movement studies, the New
Social Movements literature has put the transformation of identities at the center of
analysis (Melucci 1996a). Rather than studying the state as either the inciter or target
of mobilization, this literature demonstrates that movements can lead to social
change by focusing on culture and society (Cohen 1985). Although this is a helpful
Theor Soc (2009) 38:423–458
DOI 10.1007/s11186-009-9091-7
C. Tuğal (*)
Sociology Department, 410 Barrows Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720-1980, USA
e-mail: ctugal@berkeley.edu
point of departure for understanding cases such as Turkish Islamism, it can lead us to
neglect how the state is still central to the process of mobilization, even when it is
not openly challenged.
Islamists did not deny engagement with the state, a denial that is built into the
definition of “new social movements” by Alberto Melucci (1989) and others.
Identity-formation was not an exclusive goal, but was tightly linked to desires about
restructuring the state and the economy in Turkey. Islamist mobilization was
therefore characterized by a contingent concentration on everyday life before
becoming ready to deal with the state.
Despite attempts at integrating culture into the state-centered process approach
to mobilization, certain theoretical separations still influence the way we think
about social movements. While one influential strand of social movement
theorization has focused on the generation of mobilization through targeting the
state, another has centered on the generation of power through work on civil
society. My main goal is to cast doubt on this separation. Although some of the
old oppositions in the literature (such as those between culture and structure,
identity and strategy, etc.) have been recently questioned, one binary opposition
remains central, that between society and the state. Focusing on the state or
society tends to be one of the main differentiating points between process and
identity accounts of mobilization. Blurring this distinction may allow us to look
at the separation between structure and culture from a different angle also. In this
article, I bring in a hegemonic perspective to help us to rethink such binaries by
integrating the lessons of the New Social Movements literature with the insights
of process models.
Models in the study of social movements
Below, I underline how the New Social Movements literature has highlighted the
importance of transforming everyday life for social movements and for the
generation of power. Then, I use the political process model to point out what it
misses: state structures, institutional venues, and resources are crucial both in the
formation of a movement and in its strategies. Finally, I introduce hegemony as a
framework that takes note of both the centrality of everyday life and the
indispensability of the state (both as an object of analysis and as a target for
some movements).
New social movements
The works of European scholars, especially Jean Cohen (1985), Jürgen Habermas
(1987), Melucci (1989), and Alain Touraine (1981), have pointed out that at the end
of the twentieth century movements have shifted from targeting the state to targeting
society and everyday life. Movements no longer focus on the economy and
institutional politics, they contend: they develop within civil society. Whereas old
social movements were either directed against the state or demanded state power
(Offe 1985), new social movements are no longer “political” in this sense. They find
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original ways of linking the personal, the national, and the global through by-
passing the state.1
The central focus of social movements, according to this literature, has become
the creation of identity.2 Identity is, as these scholars see it, the self-definition of the
contending group, a definition chosen by the actors themselves. The drive of
movements, according to Melucci, is certain questions that have to do with
boundaries and consciousness, rather than the reform or appropriation of institutions:
Who are we? What are our goals and means? (Melucci 1989, 1996a)3
The strength of this approach to social movements is that it notes an important
transformation in the focus of social movements, seemingly away from the state and
the economy and toward civil society and identity politics. This shift of emphasis
from disruptive public confrontation with authorities to the challenging of dominant
codes and creation of new meanings (Melucci 1996a, pp. 202–203) is crucial if we
want to understand Islamism.
Yet, this literature’s assumption that social autonomy has expanded so much that
actors can create social identity without interference from powerful parties could be
questioned even in Western Europe; when it comes to Islamism, this presupposition
is much more problematic. In all predominantly Muslim countries, the states (along
with the global hegemon, the United States) have participated in the constitution of
Islamic actors. There were no self-constituting social movement subjects, as in the
models of Melucci, Touraine, and Cohen.
Another problem is that this approach might be downplaying how some
contemporary movements still target the state in roundabout ways even when they
do not challenge it publicly. Therefore, state-centered social movement theories, as
well as other theories of politics that focus on the state, are still relevant for cases
such as Islamism.
2 The emphasis on the dynamic and active creation of identity differentiates the work of Melucci from
what has been criticized as “identity theory” and its assumption of coherent, stable, and rigid identities
(Meeks 2001). Invoking the Bourdieusian criticism of identity theory by Brubaker and Cooper (2000), I
use identity as a category of practice rather than a category of analysis, and therefore talk of “identity
politics,” “identity work,” or “identity-formation” rather than simply “identity.”
3 While I concur with this emphasis on identity, I also submit that these questions (and the answers to
them) are not always posed at the conscious, cognitive level, but are embedded in habits and practices—
though they might pass the threshold of consciousness in certain situations. Therefore, research should
focus also on “the principles of division” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977) that mark the boundaries between “us”
and “them” (which are conveyed in everyday practice and speech), rather than only looking at how
activists choose to define the group and its others through conscious discourse. Melucci (1996b) does
recognize the importance of habits and practices in his book The Playing Self, but he has not integrated the
insights of this book to his theorization of mobilization. (See King [2004] for an attempt in this direction.)
Despite the NSM literature’s more thorough focus on consciousness, there are scholars in this tradition
who squarely focus on everyday practices such as clothing, (not) shaving, treatment of others, gestures,
and haircut (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Whittier 1995).
1 For the differences between the North American and Western European contexts of social movements
theorization, see Diane Davis (1999). Despite the differences noted by Davis, the move away from the
state and the economy in the theorization of mobilization is also observable in the American uses of
identity theory (Epstein 1996; Taylor and Whittier 1995). Yet, there are important exceptions to this.
Although Paul Lichterman’s (1996) book The Search for Political Community (especially chapters 5 and
6) focuses broadly on the relation between political projects and personal life, there are clues in this book
about how American environmental movements link everyday life and the state (also see Taylor 1989).
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Finally, the identity politics model tends to be too restrictive in its emphasis on
the democratic mode of operation of social movements. For example, Cohen (1985,
pp. 707–710) differentiates between pre-modern, old-style defenses of the life
world4 (which protected the existing, traditional communities) and new social
movements that defend associational, reflexive, democratizing, and self-limiting life
worlds against the encroachment of the market and the state.5 I propose that
Islamism resembles a new social movement as it produces collective identity in a
reflexive manner and through associational activities (rather than depending on
received religious wisdom and existing communities), while it falls short of the
perfect model since it is not a self-limiting and democratizing project. Therefore, in
analyzing Islamism, we can integrate aspects of the New Social Movement
(henceforth NSM) approach, but cannot adopt it in its entirety.
If we want to globalize the NSM framework and move it beyond its initial
Western European and North American contexts, we have to be more flexible about
these three issues (the state as one of the creators of identities; the state as one of the
targets; movements’ modes of operation). Process scholars have started to address
“the core democracy bias” of their model (McAdam et al. 2001). Similar work needs
to be done with the NSM approach to make it more globally relevant.
Theories of political opportunity and resource mobilization
The state is at the center of the political process paradigm, which was developed
mainly by Charles Tilly (1978), Doug McAdam (1982), and Sidney Tarrow ([1994]
1998). Tilly (1995a) and Tarrow (1993) have forcefully argued that social
movements emerged in the nineteenth century as a result of the centralization of
states and have taken the states as their targets.6 Along these lines, Tilly (1984, p.
304) has influentially defined a social movement as “an organized, sustained, self-
conscious challenge to existing authorities.”7 The focus of this literature is how
social movement actors strategically (and in most cases rationally, see McAdam
[1982, pp. 37, 39] and Tarrow [1998, p. 24]) make use of contingent opportunities
provided by the political structure, and especially by the state (whence the model’s
other name, political opportunity structures, henceforth POS8).
Complementing the POS model, the resource mobilization (RM) approach has
emphasized that the availability of organizational venues, expertise, time, financial
4 Cohen critically builds this discussion on Habermas’s opposition between the life world (the
experienced, informal, intimate, communicative level of social life) and the (formal and rationalized)
systems (such as the state and the economy).
5 Even when Habermas (1996) and Cohen and Arato (1992) recognize the interdependency between
society and state as targets, the model of social movements they develop remains mostly prescriptive
rather than being analytical. Most crucially, they emphasize the egalitarian, communicative, and open
nature of civil society and social movements, while the analyses below draw attention to how mobilization
defines and institutes new patterns of domination and inequality while eroding older patterns. The
normative dichotomies that Habermas provides (e.g., coerced vs. free public spheres) are inadequate to
decipher the processes of naturalization-denaturalization revealed by hegemonic analysis (see below).
6 Others have elaborated these findings by broadening the comparative framework and integrating
counter-movements to the analysis of interactions between movements and states (Kriesi et al. 1995;
Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Parsa 1989).
7 Also see Tilly (1982, p. 26) and McAdam et al. (2001, p. 5) for parallel definitions.
8 See Goodwin and Jasper (1999) for the different implications of using these two labels.
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assets, and elite sponsorship are central to the likelihood of mobilization (Gamson
1975; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973). This
focus on the strategic use of resources, missing in the identity approach, should not
be left out of analyses of movements. Yet, the RM approach leaves out what the
identity approach emphasizes. Just like the POS model, it handles actors as
exclusively strategic and rational. Movements, it assumes, put resources to the
service of already defined movement goals.9 To the degree that it touches on them,
the RM approach handles identity and everyday life instrumentally: these do not
constitute the primary foci of movement activity, but their deployment may become
tools for inciting people (Morris 1984; Zald 1996).10 We need an approach, I claim,
that recognizes the goal-creating as well as instrumental, the habits-transforming as
well as state-targeting aspects of movements.
Although POS and RM models have increasingly tackled questions of culture
(Auyero 2004, pp. 420–421),11 the scholars associated with these approaches have
most of the time neglected how culture, everyday life, identity-formation, and habits
might not only be resources, instruments, and aspects of society that are transformed
as a result of mobilization, but the very focus of movement activity.12 A frequent
response to such criticisms has been to belittle identity-oriented movements and
explanations. For instance, Tarrow (1998, p. 204) has bemoaned the fact that the
civil rights movement was universalist, whereas its contemporary inheritors are
particularistic. “Movements that privilege identity ignore opportunities,” he laments,
and march on the English Department while the Right takes the White House.13
Such dismissals of identity politics unwittingly deploy the usual dichotomies
between identity-formation and macro-politics. They neglect that the Right that was
taking over the White House had its own identity politics, which was mobilized
through churches, associations, and think-tanks, if not through English departments.
Yet, these dismissals do have an element of truth, in that an exclusive focus on “the
English Department” (a metaphor that captures identity-formation, language, civil
society, and the everyday) if coupled with an evasion of “the White House” (that is,
9 For a similar instrumentalist approach to the question of how a movement frames its goals, see Benford
(1993), Gamson (1988), and Snow et al. (1986).
10 Other scholars working on American and British cases have problematized the givenness of movement
goals and demonstrated how they are constituted through narrative, thinking, and dialogic discourse
(Polletta 1998a, b, 2006; Schurman and Munro 2006; Steinberg 1998, 1999), yet everyday life and bodily
practice has been marginal to their accounts.
11 See especially Tilly (1986, 1995b) on learning and repertoires. Also see later attempts to bring framing,
RM and POS literatures together, thereby integrating culture to the very heart of political processes
(Gamson and Meyer 1996; Kurzman 1996).
12 The contentious politics model developed by McAdam et al. (2001) has integrated the analysis of
identity to process models, but still holds that the important cultural work occurs after the mobilization is
triggered by broader changes and by the emergence/perception of opportunities and threats (pp. 47, 48).
McAdam et al. take identity as mostly shaped by public and dramatic contention, and do not look at
preceding identity work, which might have prepared subjects for contention (pp. 55–63; also see pp. 167–
169, 244–246). While they recognize in passing that creation of movement targets and identities also
occurs “over the long run and outside of contentious interaction” (p. 144), no tools are provided for the
analysis of such creation. Schurman and Munro (2006) have also drawn attention to the lack of
theorization regarding this pre-contentious phase of mobilization in political process explanations.
13 The metaphor belongs to Todd Gitlin (1995), who criticizes the excesses of identity politics.
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politics proper and the state) would be fatal—for movements as well as for the
analyses of movements.
Integrating culture into the institutional
Several scholars have already called for combining the insights of POS, NSM, and
other cultural approaches more rigorously (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Meyer et al.
2002; Mueller 1992; Voss 1996). I aim to contribute to this integrative turn by i)
drawing attention to everyday practices as a site of contention ii) underlining how
some movements attempt to transform both society and state. Below, I briefly
discuss some major contributions to the integrative turn and point out what can be
developed further in these accounts.
Two influential edited volumes (Goodwin and Jasper 2004a; Johnston and
Klandermans 1995) have discussed several elements of culture and how they
influence mobilization. These elements include symbols, codes, identity, narrative,
discourse, ideology, and frames. I suggest that, in the case of some movements,
everyday practices are more central than these elements. The contributors to one of
these volumes come close to the perspective developed here when they discuss
rituals (Fine 1995, p. 131; Swidler 1995, pp. 27–29; Taylor and Whittier 1995, pp.
175–180). Taylor and Whittier (pp. 164, 173–174) go further than the others in
highlighting the politicization of everyday routine, especially in lesbian feminist
movements. Here I expand on Taylor and Whittier’s insights by developing their
emphasis on practices.
More recently, Francesca Polletta (2006) showed that the cultural aspects of
movements also create interests, rather than just furthering them. She has also
demonstrated how cultural form can be a target rather than just a resource for
movements (Polletta 2002). I take this insight and extend it to the level of everyday
practices.14 Furthermore, just as Polletta (2002, pp. 7–10) shows there is no
necessary trade-off between political virtue and political strategy, I show that for the
Islamists there was no trade-off between targeting everyday life and targeting the
state (as an NSM scholar might expect).
Together with these recent advances, Cohen’s early work provides one of the
most thorough syntheses of the process and identity oriented approaches. Cohen
(1985, pp. 708, 715–716) pointed out that most contemporary movements involved
both an identity-creating component and a strategic/rational calculation component.
The two major approaches to collective action, argued Cohen, suffered from
neglecting one of these aspects and overemphasizing the other. Below, I build on
Cohen’s insights and seek to analyze the identity-creating and strategic components
of Islamic mobilization in conjunction with each other.
However, I also point out that Cohen remained on the NSM perspective side and
reproduced the differentiation between these approaches by differentiating between
old movements that targeted the state and new movements that targeted civil society.
Cohen (1985, p. 667) stated that new social movements “target the social domain of
“civil society” rather than the economy or state, raising issues concerned with the
14 Polletta (2002, pp. 16–20, 221–222) looks at how everyday life (routine forms of decision-making,
conflict resolution, etc.) influences movements, but not at how movements transform everyday life.
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democratization of structures of everyday life and focusing on forms of
communication and collective identity.” I seek to go beyond Cohen by pointing
out that some movements target both society and the state.
Coming from the other angle, scholars who have criticized or extended the
political process approach have questioned many of the conceptual separations in the
field. Among them, James Jasper (2004) has blurred the distinction between identity
and strategy and (like Cohen) argued that these are interlocking aspects of a
movement.15 Goodwin and Jasper (2004b, pp. 88–91), Polletta (2004), and Marc
Steinberg (2004, pp. 124–129, 132) have also questioned the binary opposition
between culture and structure. I draw on these insights below. However, the civil
society/state binary remains intact in most of this work, and the state is allegedly the
primary target of movements. This article contributes to these integrative attempts by
handling political processes and “politics proper” (the targeting of states,
municipalities and other explicitly political institutions) on the one hand and
“identity politics” (or, in our case, the politics of everyday practice) on the other as
the intertwined moments of hegemonic politics.
Hegemonic analysis
I contend that, in the case of certain movements, mobilization for a sociopolitical
purpose can be handled as the formation of an alternative hegemony. I define
“hegemony” by modifying Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) conceptualization: the
organization of power in society and state through the constitution and naturalization
of an everyday routine (also see Laitin 1986). I take the state as the interlinked set of
institutions (including the government, local governments, the military, the police,
courts, etc.) that organize domination in a polity through policy-making, coercion,
regulation, and consent; and I take society as the associational groupings that
mediate between the state and the economy (including family and kin networks, non-
governmental organizations, informal networks, religious institutions, educational
institutions, etc.).16 In the case of the movements that I will call “hegemonic,” the
reorganization of everyday practices is interwoven with the transformation of the
state. So, some social movements attack both society and state through denatural-
izing everyday life and constituting an alternative everyday routine.
Social analysts have previously used hegemony in the sense of a cultural blinder
that prevents the emergence of coherent and critical consciousness (Gaventa 1982,
pp. 19–20; Gramsci 1971). Hegemony, in this account, prevents “issues from arising,
grievances from being voiced, and interests from being recognized,” especially
through influencing the perceptions of the dominated and their conceptions of issues
15 While my use of the term “strategy” here is similar to Jasper’s in emphasizing the institutional and
cultural contexts of strategy, mine differs by focusing less on conscious and explicit decision making, and
more on practical logics of position-taking. In this sense, my use has more parallels with Bourdieu’s
(1977), though Jasper (1997) also relies on Bourdieu in his definition of strategic choice. Also see
Clemens (1993, 1996).
16 However, this is only a heuristic distinction, and the content and form of the differentiation between
society and state depends upon political context and struggles (Mitchell 1999).
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(Gaventa 1982, pp. vii, 1, 12–13, 63, 114). Here, I shift attention from the
consciousness and minds of individuals to the naturalization of practices.17
The concept of hegemony captures how power is constituted in both state and
society. State and society are intertwined in this process: they are not additive. It
follows that hegemonic mobilization reconfigures state and society through a long
walk, which concentrates on repetitive conversations, oral debates, readings (of
newspapers, books, pamphlets), education, rituals, and routinized everyday
practices, and which only infrequently leads to explosions. This is the rarely
recognized, “molecular” dimension of mobilization that is too easily ignored because
of our focus on street action.18 But, in many cases, this street action presupposes the
formation of a collectivity through inculcated dispositions. Grievances are not
omnipresent, as political process theorists assume (Hafez 2003; McCarthy and Zald
1977; Tilly 1978); they are constructed by movements (Schurman and Munro 2006).
Hegemonic mobilization is formative of actors. According to this framework, the
most important resources are those that allow the movement to institute alternative
daily routines. Yet, the organization of hegemony, which is necessarily a process of
identity-formation, goes beyond the creation of identity (as the NSM scholarship
understands it), as its terrain of struggle encompasses state and society. Table 1 situates
the hegemonic approach to mobilization with respect to POS and NSM approaches.
A potential weakness in Gramsci’s theorization of hegemony calls for combining
his and Pierre Bourdieu’s insights. Whereas Gramsci handles the formation of hege-
mony mostly in terms of consciousness and awareness, habits and (conscious, semi-
conscious, or unconscious) everyday strategies are also crucial in the constitution of
a hegemonic collectivity.19 These everyday practices result from embodied
principles of division, which are inculcated in actors through (politically guided)
19 Scholars from diverse intellectual traditions have noted the centrality of everyday life to the
reproduction of society (Bellah et al. 1985; Melucci 1996b; Smith 1987). They have argued that habits
and everyday practices naturalize social and political systems (Bourdieu [1980] 1990; Lefebvre ((1947)
1991). The literature on everyday life and practices is broad, and an article-length treatment of social
movement theory cannot possibly do justice to it. My emphasis on Bourdieu rather than other key theorists
of the everyday is due to his exploration of strategy in a structural context, which differentiates him from
those who see everyday life as almost completely shaped by the development of capitalism or state-
formation (Elias [1939] 2000; Lefebvre ((1947) 1991). and those who attribute infinite malleability to
everyday practices (de Certeau [1974] 1984; Goffman 1959; Scott 1985).
17 Gramscian analysts in American sociology have previously focused on how subordinate groups resist
hegemony and achieve autonomy (Billings 1990, p. 3). My concern, rather, is how religion might become
the prime mover of an alternative hegemonic project through transforming everyday life and constituting
the subjects (rather than only shaping worldviews, as in Billings, Gaventa, and most Gramscian literature).
18 Other scholars have problematized the exclusive focus on street action, but this has mostly taken the
form of pointing out how institutional politics spills into transgression, or how the boundary between the
two is maintained and contested (O’Brien 2003) rather than looking at the interlinkages between everyday
life and transgression. McAdam et al. (2005) have recently problematized the focus on disruptive protest
and suggested that we readjust our lenses to also look at peaceful protests—a suggestion that still leaves
everyday work outside of the purview of social movement theory.
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socialization as collective dispositions.20 And just like the awareness, the disposi-
tions too encompass society and state: they shape actors’ relation to society as well
as to the state. To put it differently, Bourdieu’s theorization leads us to focus on
actors’ dispositions to divide and perceive time and space in specific ways. These
tendencies of perception and division, in turn, give rise to a specific set of routine
activities (which I here call everyday practices). Dispositions, more generally,
include internalized tendencies to act in certain ways rather than others (reading the
holy book at night rather than watching television, fearing and obeying God rather
than the state, avoiding contact with the opposite sex, participating in political
activities in one’s district rather than spending the weekend with one’s family,
interrupting work when the call to prayer is read, etc.)
As seen below, once the flow of everyday practices is organized around prayer
times, it takes less explicit ideological persuasion to make people pray, as their habits
become self-perpetuating. Yet, even this self-perpetuation works best when it is
regulated (though not necessarily ideologically imposed) by institutions like
municipalities and local governments. Therefore, any theory of hegemony, and the
understanding of hegemonic social movements, should include a discussion of
everyday practices and rituals.21
21 Emotions can also be handled as constituting a subset of the everyday practices and dispositions
discussed in this article (see below for struggles over and experiences of fear, love, devotion, etc.). Similar
to what I am proposing here, Elizabeth Perry (2002) and Deborah Gould (2002) have demonstrated how
activists target both society and state through working on feelings. However, despite many empirical
contributions (Goodwin et al. 2001), the scholarly work on emotions in social movements is only
beginning to offer a comprehensive theoretical agenda (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005).
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20 Here, I am drawing on Bourdieu’s writings (1977, [1979] 1984) on strategies and the habitus (collective
dispositions and principles of vision and division). That this socialization is politically guided under the
influence of social movement activists, intellectuals, political institutions, and politicians is ignored in
Bourdieu’s work, which necessitates a fusion of his contributions with Gramsci’s. While Bourdieu
explains the dynamics of collective dispositions based on a primarily structural account, bringing in
Gramsci allows us to focus on the partially political making of these dispositions—a supplement that
complements and displaces Bourdieu’s structural approach rather than replacing it.
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Setting and methods
The locality where I studied the Islamist movement, Sultanbeyli, is the district with
the highest Islamist party votes in Istanbul (Turkey’s largest metropolitan center). A
village of 3,700 people before 1985, Sultanbeyli had become a district of 80,000 by
1989. This has mostly been an informal development, and most of the buildings are
still unregistered. While the district received rural immigrants from all parts of
Turkey, immigrants from the Black Sea region and the Kurdish provinces in the East
predominated, along with second-generation immigrants to the city from the same
regions. The majority of the district is composed of primary school graduates (many
of them concentrated in the construction sector) and its population is younger when
compared to the rest of Istanbul (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu 2001, pp. 286, 288–289, 318–
319). Together with its political affiliation, the district’s informal growth22 has made
it a frequent target of secularist23 policy and criticism.
Located on the outskirts of the city (near Izmit, an industrial city to the east of
Istanbul), Sultanbeyli is the first urban district to have an elected Islamist
municipality. Before the late 1980s, Sultanbeyli had no dominant political or
religious color. Like many urban districts, center-leftists (the Social Democratic
Populist Party) and center-rightists (the Motherland Party) vied for power. The
decisive politicization started after the mid-1980s, when religious people in
provincial towns and villages heard about the Islamic educational activities in the
district and immigrated to Sultanbeyli in networks of family, kin, and religious
community. Islamist activists spread the word as far as Erzurum (a provincial region
of Eastern Turkey) in the East and Germany in the West, and many families bought
land in the district without ever having seen it. Immigrant women were also active in
attracting relatives to the district, by telling them that this was the primary site of
religious awakening in Turkey. In short, the interaction between politics and (kin and
religious) networks was central to the creation of an Islamic district.
The (Islamist) Welfare Party controlled the municipality after the elections of
1989, until a secularist coup in 1997. While there was political opposition to the
Islamists throughout the 1990s (organized around the center-right True Path Party
and the center-left Republican People’s Party, and later the Democratic Left Party),
this remained weak when compared to opposition from the military and the local
government. One of the high moments of the struggle between the Welfare Party and
the military revolved around an Atatürk statue. In Turkey, one can see Atatürk
statues and busts in every public square, park, and official building. These remind
citizens of the official commitment to the founding leader Atatürk’s secular
nationalism.24 In 1996, the Sultanbeyli mayor Koçak removed the most visible
Atatürk statue in the district from the main boulevard to a neighborhood park. The
22 This rapid and informal growth was actually related to the district’s political affiliation, as the Islamist
municipality opened the way to informality in order to bring in as many people as possible and strengthen
Islamism’s base. Not all the incoming immigrants were necessarily Islamist to begin with, but some of
them underwent a thorough process of Islamicization.
23 In the Turkish context, secularism (laiklik) refers to the propagation of nationalism, capitalism, and
Westernization through religious and non-religious channels, rather than a straightforward differentiation
between religious and other spheres of life (Tuğal 2007; Davison 1998; Mardin 1989).
24 Özyürek (2006) provides a thorough analysis of how this symbolism has changed over the decades.
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military responded by storming the district with tanks and re-erecting the statue. After
this point, Welfare Party authorities avoided any direct confrontation with the state.
Islamicizing activities in the district abated after the secularist military interven-
tion of 1997, which restricted Islamic schools and religious orders throughout
Turkey, in addition to closing down the Welfare Party, youth organizations, and some
religious teahouses. After the intervention, Islamists organized in the Virtue Party,
which had toned down its criticism of the establishment. Despite this moderation, the
regime ratcheted up its pressure on the Islamists, and the Virtue Party was going
through a split during the final stages of this study. The Virtue Party held municipal
power in Sultanbeyli until it was closed down by the secularist courts in 2002.
The exceptionally intense politicization in Sultanbeyli makes the district a suitable
case for studying the influence of politics at the everyday level. Yet it also gives an
idea about the restrictions of this case and the generalizability and replicability of the
findings: the results of this study might speak more to cases where movements have
such a great affect that they call the fundamentals of the existing order into question.25
Participant observation is arguably the ideal way of conducting research about the
practices of activists (Lichterman 1998), especially about routine everyday practices
and dispositions that might not always pass the threshold of consciousness. These
dispositions are not always accessible through surveys and interviews that depend on
actors’ accounts. Through participant observation at several sites in Sultanbeyli from
the summer of 2000 to the summer of 2002, I collected material on the interactions
between religion, politics, and movement dynamics. These sites—especially the
municipality, mosques, workplaces, conferences, and religious teahouses—were
among Islamism’s main mobilizing structures in the district.
I studied the mosques of the district center and of peripheral neighborhoods
through regularly attending Friday sermons and also observing regular community
prayer services, which are held five times a day. I also focused on coffeehouses and
religious teahouses, where unemployed men spend their days, and the employed
come to socialize after they return home from work. In the municipality and the local
Islamist party headquarters, I studied the interactions between Islamist functionaries
and the people. I taught at a secular public school within the borders of the district,
while also analyzing institutions of religious education such as state-sponsored
clerical high schools, Qur’an schools (a rough equivalent of Sunday schools), and
madrasas. My attendance at popular conferences was also crucial to my
understanding of Islamism, as hundreds of people attended these in Sultanbeyli.
The discussions of religion carried out here trickled down to debates in workplaces
and teahouses, regulating residents’ everyday behaviors.
I conducted fifty semi-structured, in-depth interviews, which mostly lasted one to
one-and-a-half hours, where I asked fifty-six interviewees about their life in the
district, their interpretation of religion, and their opinions on local and national
politics. Due to the highly segregated life among the religious residents, I had more
access to the male half of the district because of my position as a male researcher.
25 The reader should also keep in mind the specificity of the time frame (2000–2002): Islamists had just
gone through a military defeat in Turkey, even though Islamism was still intact as a project and popular in
this district (which was less the case after 2002).
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While I could formally interview only three females, I had numerous interactions
with the mothers of my students and the wives of a few of my contacts. The
interviewees were chosen through snowball sampling. Both individual and group
interviews were conducted. The individual interviews (a total of 47) comprised talks
with 11 small merchants and shopkeepers, sixteen workers, two retired workers,
three housewives, an imam (prayer leader), two religion teachers, three primary
school teachers, three real estate dealers, three politicians, and three functionaries
from the municipality. Of the three group interviews, two were with construction
workers (in groups of two and three) and the other was with four recent graduates of
Sultanbeyli’s clerical high school.
I openly declared to the people I interacted with that I was in the district for
purposes of research. My affiliation with an American university initially raised
suspicions. However, working in the district as a teacher allowed me to build trust
and networks. Renting an apartment near my school, I gradually moved beyond my
initial contacts.
The data collected at these sites and through these interviews were used to reflect
on, evaluate, and expand existing theories, employing the logic of the extended case
method (Burawoy et al. 1991). I therefore take Sultanbeyli not as a microcosm of the
Islamic world (based on which one could draw inferences to represent all Muslims),
but as a case from which the analyst can extend to larger structural forces and
theoretical questions, by recognizing the locality’s specificity.26 I will thus use the
Sultanbeyli case to rethink some of the conceptual oppositions in the field of social
movements and discuss how insights from a hegemonic framework can contribute to
casting a doubt on them.
In the next section, I outline the role of the state and socioeconomic changes in
the making of Islamism. In the following sections, I analyze how Islamists shape
everyday life and its rhythms in a variety of settings. I then look at how this
reconstruction of the everyday is linked to institutions and public offices.
Macro-determinants of Islamist strategies
Scholars who have used political process models to explain the dynamics of
Islamism have tended to reduce this movement to a rational response to political
conditions, or at best a wise use of Islamic frames to exploit political openings and
resources (Alexander 2000).27 They have thereby neglected the everyday religious
work done by Islamism, or this has constituted a lesser focus when compared to
questions of framing, networks, resources, or political opportunities (e.g., Singerman
2004, p. 151; but see Clark 2004). Other work in this vein has analyzed culture and
religion more thoroughly, while however still retaining a focus on movement
activities oriented toward the state, rather than studying these in conjunction with
26 Again following the extended case method, I emphasize process and context over reliability and
replicability, and theory reconstruction over representativeness (Burawoy 1998).
27 Two articles that employ social movement theories have criticized this reductionism, but have not
proposed satisfactory theoretical alternatives (Kuru 2005; Munson 2001).
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how Islamic mobilization transforms everyday life (Wickham 2002; Wiktorowicz
2004).
Those others who have approached the topic with a Touraineian bent have
explored the everyday dimension of the movement, but have not theorized
adequately the constitutive role of the state in the making of Islamism (Göle
1996). Other civil society-oriented analyses—such as Jenny White’s (2002) analysis
of Islamism in a district of Istanbul—privilege networks, culture, and identification
over politics and the state, ignoring how all of these are constructed politically (and
to an extent by the state).
The hegemonic approach emphasizes that the rise of Islamism had socioeconom-
ic, political, and institutional determinants. The neo-liberal dismantling of
agricultural support structures led to an influx of rural immigrants to already de-
industrializing cities in the 1980s and 1990s (Keyder 1999). The incoming
immigrants became more pious, partially as a result of the Islamist party’s
responsiveness to their economic needs and the repression of the Left that could
speak to these needs. The Islamist party received less than 10% of the national vote
before 1980, and its electorate was concentrated in the provinces.28 After it shifted
its agenda to appeal to the rural immigrants, its votes increased to around 20 percent
by the mid-1990s. Although apparently not very high, these votes granted the
Welfare Party municipal and governmental power due to the extreme fragmentation
of center parties. Wide-scale corruption, failure to resolve ethnic strife, and the
impoverishment and dislocation resulting from structural adjustment programs had
also discredited center-right and center-left parties, opening the way to the
nationwide electoral success of Islamism.
In Istanbul, the last blow to the popular hope invested in the center-left was the
incompetent municipal administration of the Social Democratic Populist Party
(1989–1994), which culminated in one of the most symbolic Islamic electoral
victories in Turkish history: the takeover of the Istanbul metropolitan municipality in
1994. Concomitant to this loss and the rise of Islamism, center-leftist parties shifted
to an exclusive Kemalism29 (a rigid defense of Atatürk’s principles), gradually
moving away from the left-populist and social democratic elements they had
incorporated starting with the 1960s. This left Islamist parties as the only channel for
social justice politics in poor neighborhoods like Sultanbeyli.
Moreover, in the 1980s and 1990s, official mosques and appointed imams started
to be insufficient and self-appointed imams with (underground) sufi, madrasa, or lay
training filled in the gaps. Community-built and officially unregistered mosques
sprouted all over the major cities of Turkey.
Certain sufi orders and madrasa scholars, along with many clerical school and
theology school graduates who did not rise to prominent positions in top religious
official institutions (i.e., the Directorate of Religious Affairs and theology schools),
lined up behind Islamism against state-controlled, “official” Islam. This was the
28 See Sarıbay (1985) for the platform and the electoral record of the relatively marginal Milli Salvation
Party, which was a precursor to the popular Welfare Party.
29 In the Turkish political lexicon, “Kemalizm” (Kemalism) is loosely, and not always consistently,
differentiated from “Atatürkçülük” (Atatürkism). The latter refers to an overall abidance to Atatürk’s
principles, whereas the former connotes a more militant and assertive position, especially against Islamic
activism. Kemalists claim that they are the only true Atatürkists.
Theor Soc (2009) 38:423–458 435
secular state’s own doing to an extent, since it had created an inflation in clerical
school graduates, with the main purpose of combating the Left, but did not create
new positions of religious authority with high prestige or income that these new
graduates could go into. Together with the state’s ideological opening to Islam’s
politicization and deployment in public after 1980 (a “political opportunity,” one
could say), this structural change also contributed to the rise of Islamism. Such an
involvement of the state in the creation of a movement would be incomprehensible
from an exclusive NSM point of view, which requires us to bring in insights from
both political opportunity and identity models by focusing on the state as one of the
creators of identity (Meyer 2002).
The main Islamizing actors in Sultanbeyli were the Islamist party, imams,
intellectuals, and tradesmen. Islamism was also the main tendency among the
columnists and editors of the newspapers (Akit, Milli Gazete, Yeni Şafak) they
followed. The officially appointed imams of the geographically central mosques
tended to subscribe to official Islam. More radical varieties of Islamism30 were
mainly the ideology of young graduates of theology schools and clerical schools.
Some of these graduates were public school teachers; some worked in the local
municipality; and some were unemployed. Most of them were either members of
fringe groups, or had relations with them in their school years.
While the Islamist party and other movement organizations had several million
members in the 1990s, they used the streets sparingly, only when religious liberties
(e.g., veiling in schools) and institutions (e.g. clerical and Qur’an schools) were
seriously threatened. This was partially due to the remarkable failure of the Left after
fifteen years of street mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s. Islamists had learned
from this experience that such politics was crushed pitilessly by the army, the police,
and nationalist paramilitary groups; another route had to be taken. The weariness of
ordinary citizens, who had been demoralized by the thousands of deaths during
leftist mobilization, also necessitated a different strategy of mobilization. In this
context, the poignant frame that the Islamists used, “peace (of mind) is in Islam,”
had broad resonance.31 Islamist street action further waned after the secularist
military intervention in 1997, and was virtually non-existent during the 27 months I
spent in the field. However, the alternative mobilization strategies of the Islamists,
which depended on transforming everyday life rather than on confrontation with
authorities, enabled the movement to persist even under the harsh post-1997
conditions. Despite sometimes unfavorable political conditions, these activists
30 Radical Islamism, as I use it here, refers to a non-conservative, foundational critique of secularism and
mainstream Islamism. What I call mainstream Islamism emphasizes the family, morality, and social
harmony and seeks to accommodate traditional Islam. Radical Islamism, by contrast, demands a total
transformation of Middle Eastern regimes and of traditional Islam, both of which they deem contrary to
authentic Islam. See Tuğal (2006) for a more detailed differentiation.
31 This frame is also telling in its difference from the more political and action-oriented key frame of the
Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhoods: “Islam is the solution” (Wickham 2002; Wiktorowicz
2001). Framing their appeal in this way helped Islamists in Turkey productively to “misrecognize”
(Bourdieu 1977) their politics as apolitical, allowing them to thrive in a country where politics and
politicians have lost all credibility. See Dawne Moon (2004) for a similar misrecognition of politics among
North American religious communities.
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slowly Islamicized Turkey in the last two and a half decades, and paved the way for
governmental power.32
The Islamist politicization of everyday routine
The constitution of hegemony via the strategic transformation of habits unfolds in
contexts as varied as the street, the workplace, the teahouse, and the conference hall.
I will provide an example of each below. Between 2000 and 2002, the main agent of
this transformation was the (Islamist) Virtue Party and actors related to it, such as
Metin,33 a street vendor. A former construction worker, Metin had started to sell
cheap clothing after he retired. He did not perceive what he was doing as only
business but also worship, and he engaged most of his customers in religious and
political debates. With every call to prayer (three or four times during the working
hours, depending on the time of the year), Metin would quit his car and run to the
mosque, telling his customers that worship came before business. He was a member
of both a well-established religious order (İskenderpaşa Cemaati) and the Islamist
party, which made him politically and religiously very dedicated. These belongings
also conferred a sense of distinction and empowerment, which he emphasized by
displaying signs of both his party and his order in his old and worn-out car, which he
drove around for selling the merchandise.
Metin only had a primary school diploma, but persistently tried to go beyond the
limits of his official degree. He had an ambitious reading schedule composed of
the Qur’an, books about the life of the Prophet Muhammad, and texts regarding the
history of the Ottoman Empire. He derived highly political messages from his
readings:
We are a noble nation [millet] coming from a glorious past. Certain foci of evil
are trying to destroy this nobility. Imperialist and Zionist powers are playing
games on the people of Turkey. We are facing great dangers like forgetting
religion, denying our essence, looking down on Islam. If believers read the
Qur’an and understand it, they can overcome these dangers. The only way to
set oneself free from difficulties of subsistence, the strengthening immoral
current, from currents that degenerate humans, that destroy them, that deplete
their spirit, that drive them to prostitution is to learn what you believe in …
from the source [implying classical religious sources].
Metin also told me that the state should encourage returning to “the sources.” The
most important difference between the contemporary Turkish state and the Ottoman
state, according to him, was the lack of official support for religious practice and
understanding, which caused the international power of Turkey to decline steadily.
What we should note about Metin’s daily practice is that he combines regular ritual,
32 This should not, however, create an impression of unproblematic success (White 2002; Yavuz 2003).
While previous Islamists have indeed been in government for the last six years (2002–2008), this was
possible only after serious concessions and a gradual shift away from Islamism.
33 All private names are pseudonyms.
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commerce, and politics. He understands “the return to the sources” as the path
that goes to personal salvation as well as the method that will strengthen Turkey.
Along these lines, Metin encouraged his customers to develop a reading program
like himself. His everyday routine, as instituted by the Islamist movement, is also
a political routine: he does not differentiate tightly between economic practice
and religious practice, and uses Islam to organize and give direction to his
economic as well as religious routine, which he believes will create a more
glorious, prosperous, and moral society and state. His everyday practices (his
regular preaching to customers and his pressure on them to go to the mosque)
therefore naturalize the hegemony of Islamic actors and call for their control of
society and state.
This reshaping of everyday routine, both of one’s own and of others, takes on a
more contentious and more comprehensive color among more radical Islamists,
among whom are Fikret and his friends. It becomes also more denaturalizing in its
attacks against the religious and worldly lives of ordinary believers. I frequently
spent time with Fikret in his real estate bureau, where he, his partner Hidayet (both
of whom were in their forties), and his customers and friends regularly talked for
hours about Islam, Islamism, and politics. Fikret and most of his friends were
connected to the Islamist party (though ideologically they were critical of its
pragmatism), the activists of which were also among his regular visitors. His office
acted as one of the sites of opinion formation for the Islamists. Offices like this one
are indeed one of the main resources of the Islamist hegemony: they naturalize an
alternative everyday routine.
One day, Fikret and Mesut (one of his closest friends, a retired construction
worker) were talking about how pious Muslims were less and less engaged in
charity. Fikret reasoned that this was partially due to the attacks in the secular media
against the fund drives through which many pious people sent huge sums of money
to Bosnia. By arguing that these sums ended up in the treasury of the Islamist party
and its leaders, the media had demoralized the Muslims, who were now less willing
to partake in such campaigns. Hidayet was silent for a while, and finally declared
that the problems were more deep-rooted than that:
None of us are like Muslims of Asr-ı Saadet [The Age of Felicity] any more.
We have too much property. We have too many apartments. People who love
property [mala düşen] this much can’t sacrifice themselves for Islam. Some
people do go to war; it seems that they are sacrificing themselves. But actually,
there is nobody doing it with ümmet [Islamic community] consciousness. Only
some unemployed people go to the front because some rich Muslims give them
money.
Hidayet is referring here to Asr-ı Saadet, the times of the Prophet Muhammad and
the first four caliphs, when (Islamists hold) belief came before everything else
including property, the distribution of which was therefore egalitarian. While all
pious Muslims believe that Asr-ı Saadet was the ideal age in Islamic history, only
(radical) Islamists argue that Asr-ı Saadet society was a classless society that
contemporary Muslims should imitate by distributing their property or spending it
for the sake of Islam. In Hidayet’s account, the lack of ümmet consciousness—the
consciousness that would require one to prioritize belief over property and restrict
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oneself from having too much property—is tightly linked to a particular experience
of Islam as a religion:
Most people learn Islam from their mothers and fathers. Theirs is traditional
Islam. The traditional Muslims who do not know [Islam] well enough think
that they can save themselves from hell just by praying regularly. However,
most of them commit shirk [associate other creatures with God] in practice and
thereby commit the only sin that God will not forgive. God can forgive murder
and theft, but the end of shirk is perpetual hell. They do not exactly obey God’s
laws but they obey traffic laws. They fear the police more than they fear God.
Some of them love their wives more than God. All of this is shirk. [As one can
easily slip into one of these,] all ulama [Islamic scholars] in Muslim history
continually pleaded God not to condemn them to hell perpetually. All were
content to burn for a while.
The Qur’anic term shirk, which is so central to radical Islamism, involves
(depending upon the translation and interpretation) associating other creatures with
God, implying that God has partners, or setting up partners in worship with God—a
(sometimes) covert form of polytheism, which cannot be forgiven.34 According to
non-Islamist Muslim scholars, shirk happens when a person explicitly treats another
person like God (as might occur in the relations between a sufi master and his
follower). Islamists, however, are harsher in their standards and argue that obeying
anyone but God is actually shirk.
This long speech was addressed to me, as well as to Fikret and Mesut, so that we
would understand what it takes to be a Muslim—and act accordingly. For Islamists
like Hidayet, the aim of everyday interaction is to create subjects who do not fear the
state and who apply (and call and fight for the application of) Islamic precepts and
laws. These precepts should be learned by reading the written sources, rather than
orally from the parents—which would break paternal authority and institute the
authority of Islamist actors. It is not enough for Hidayet that the everyday life of a
Muslim be characterized by praying five times a day. Islamic practice, according to
him, also necessarily involves obeying all of God’s ways and laws, even when
(maybe especially when) they contradict the state’s laws or a man’s devotion to his
family. This reconfiguration of everyday practice denaturalizes the regular
dispositions of ordinary Muslims—their devotion to their families, to regular prayer,
and to the religious knowledge acquired from their parents. It is this reflexive attack
against the accustomed patterns of daily routine (so dear to the NSM literature) that
makes the Islamist movement what it is. However, contrary to accounts that neatly
separate culture from the economy and the state, Hidayet’s involvement in the
Islamist movement causes him to see his religion and his daily routine as tightly
linked to the property regime. Changing the flow of everyday life brings with it
changing the way society (and its relation to the state and the economy) is structured.
Hidayet’s religious interventions thus seek to introduce Islamic hegemony in familial
relations and the economy, and weaken allegiance to the secularist state.
34 “Verily, Allah forgives shirk not, but He forgives except that (anything else) to whom He pleases, and
whoever commits shirk, he has indeed invented a tremendous sin” (Qur’an 4:48).
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Fikret and Hidayet had both worked for several years in Saudi Arabia while in
their twenties. Residents with work experience in that country, and also those
currently performing seasonal work there, were among the leading Islamicizers in
Sultanbeyli. These figures had had the chance to see a more pious communal life in
Saudi Arabia, had integrated aspects of this in their daily routines, and now sought to
impose this on the rest of their own society. A more educated version of the same
pattern could be seen among those who were trained in Pakistani madrasas and the
Egyptian school al-Azhar.35 As different from previous workers like Fikret and
Hidayet, the residents who had been to Pakistan and Egypt retained activist and
intellectual networks with those countries. Ideas and strategies emanating from the
Islamic movements in these countries influenced the mobilization in Sultanbeyli
through such networks. Translated sources from leading Islamist movements in
Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran (along with these transnational networks) boosted piety in
the district.
In the larger context of the Islamist movement, the non-institutionalized identity
work of residents such as Fikret and Hidayet is coupled with more institutionalized
strategies, such as the publicly visible work on everyday practices that newspapers,
magazines, and conferences carry out. An instance of this can be seen in Abdullah
Yıldız’s address to the public in Sultanbeyli. Yıldız was one of the main speakers of
a conference organized by the Islamist intellectuals of the district. He is one of the
main Islamist thinkers in Turkey, and the lead author of Umran, a radical Islamist
religious and political magazine. In the last years, Umran and Yıldız were among
those who set the tone for intellectual debates regarding Islamism in Turkey. In
Sultanbeyli, Yıldız argued that the viable way of fighting imperialism was
developing and strengthening the Islamic lifestyle:
The Islamic lifestyle based on modesty, frugality, contentment [kanaat],
justice, balance, and sharing worries the West [which exercises the reverse of
these values]. That is why the West is so aggressive against Muslims. Worship
occupies a special place in this lifestyle. Prayer inculcates awe; fasting teaches
one that s/he can stay hungry if need be. But Muslims do not spread this
lifestyle through violence. The Prophet [Muhammad], for example, didn’t
force people to pray, but his attitudes and hal [demeanor] influenced people.
For being able to present such a hal to non-believers, one has to win the war
against one’s nefis [self, flesh]. Otherwise, the war against evil [şeytani] forces
(television, etc.) cannot be won. If we pray by knowing the meaning of the
prayers, we can defeat the imperialists. Cevdet Said [a Syrian Islamic thinker]
has already said that we should first look for the mistake in ourselves, not the
imperialists. We are going to overcome the imperialists by first overcoming
ourselves.
Notice that Yıldız is not inviting the residents of Sultanbeyli to boycott, protest, or
attack the “imperialists”; rather, he is telling them to perfect their religion. While
these proclamations, made before the 9/11 attacks, might sound outdated or even
falsified in the light of the recent Islamist violence against (some institutions and
35 Even though I did not encounter any residents with an official degree from an Iranian seminary, other
activists also had networks with Islamists in Iran.
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sectors of) the West, they should remind us that most Muslims (and even most
Islamists) are still not engaged in armed violence against the West. Nevertheless,
they also point out that Islamists code everyday religious practice itself in a
contentious manner, which blurs the boundaries between what is and what is not
contentious politics. Whereas we are inclined to see only street action as
“mobilization,” Islamist mobilization involves changing the patterns and rhythms
of everyday life. Reference to the Prophet Muhammad is also quite telling here, as
Islamists believe that his exemplary daily conduct did not only lead him to win and
take over the hearts (and “identity”) of his contenders and of third parties, but also
the state of his rivals. In summary, Islamic hegemony seeks to counter Western
domination through correcting the self, which will allow pious actors to exercise
power over the non-pious—not by force, but by consent.
The division and re-organization of space
An analysis of how the Islamic movement refashions the use of social space will
help us question some of the common binary oppositions in the social movement
scholarship. According to Nilüfer Göle (1996), the distinctiveness of Islamic culture
lies in its emphasis on closed spaces that make women less visible and contactable,
thereby preserving communal morality (through controlling women's sexuality). The
more Islamically oriented Sultanbeyli inhabitants built their neighbourhoods and
apartments by keeping this precept in mind. Those who could afford it built gardens
surrounded by high walls, which provided space for the socialization of women in a
manner that would not be observable from the outside. A lot of poor immigrants,
however, did not have the resources to finance such an architectural structure. The
most conservative among them compensated for this disadvantage by building
houses with windows that did not permit the visibility of the interior. Another
architectural feature in some of these houses is the layout of the rooms, the doors of
which are not immediately visible to each other. As a result of this layout, males who
are not the members of its kin network can still visit a conservative family without
necessarily encountering the female members of the household. Islamic mobilization
differentiated this district from other districts of Istanbul, therefore, even at the
architectural level. While my stance as a male researcher restricted my access
because of this layout, my position in the district as a teacher allowed me to visit the
parents of my students, temporarily eliminating the architectural barrier within
certain limits.
This spatial differentiation is one of the goals of Islamicization, but it also creates
the geographical resources for further female mobilization, together with subordi-
nating women. Various layers of female practice in the district reproduce and
negotiate this spatial configuration. The women of families that have settled without
a wide network of relatives generally do not leave their streets. Their house visits are
restricted, the neighbours see them as outsiders, and they have nobody to walk the
streets of the district with. This leaves them without much to do, since they see the
city as unpredictable and dangerous, which keeps them from going out by
themselves.
Women with wide networks of relatives, on the other hand, frequently go on
house visits. They know by heart the streets of the neighborhood because they have
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relatives spread across the district. They go in groups of neighbors to the bazaars of
their own neighborhood and others, not only for shopping, but also for seeing
relatives. Short house visits of relatives follow bazaar incursions in other
neighborhoods.
These networks have their own drawbacks, however, since mechanisms of control
over women also get more intense to the degree that the community itself is wide.
Women with wide networks always have to take into account the opinions of their
neighbors; they have to keep their houses tidy and clean, since they are always in
interaction with others: anyone can visit them at any moment of the day. There is
very little of what might be called personal space in their homes, since most of the
space there is in community use.
Women living in small community networks, such as an apartment building of
three stories of agnates as in Halime’s case, feel the pressures of networks, without
enjoying the benefits of community life: they are imprisoned in their buildings or
streets, and are also under tight control. Halime’s husband, who owns a small
workshop, has married a young woman without divorcing Halime36 and settled in
another district, leaving her with his brothers and their families in two adjacent
apartment buildings. Her female as well as male kin who live on her street restrict
Halime’s contacts with outsiders. Halime expressed her restrictions poignantly as she
told me the reason why she encourages her son (then in eighth grade) to pursue his
studies:
In the village I wandered around more. Since I came here, I haven’t done that.
As I haven’t gone to school I can’t wander around in the city. I only know two
streets beyond this one. I want him to be educated so that he can wander
around.
As there is consistent emphasis in Turkish public discourse on the civilizing and
liberating influence of education, rural immigrants sometimes blame themselves and
their “ignorance” for their lack of freedom. Patriarchy, however, is not a legitimate
target in conservative neighborhoods, which prevents Halime from criticizing the
restrictions imposed by her kin network, let alone questioning the overall spatial
structure of the district.
For women from conservative families, one strategy of expanding one’s space
within these restrictions is pushing religious reasoning to its logical conclusions and
arguing that everybody, irrespective of gender, should work for God’s glory.37 When
this strategy is used, the political participation of women is specifically enabled
through the architectural arrangement of the district: the space produced by the
Islamic movement becomes a resource for women's religious mobilization. Under
the current regime of segregation, their participation in political and public life is not
perceived as a threat to morality or as an invitation to sexual permissiveness. Fatma,
a young activist of the Virtue Party, told me that she enjoyed the district very much
36 Polygamy, though prohibited by secular law, is still practiced in both urban and rural areas of Turkey
(Yilmaz 2003).
37 For the mixed blessings of this strategy, see Mahmood (2005).
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because she could go everywhere without being noticed too much by men. She
added:
We would be suffocated in districts like Kadıköy [a central district of Istanbul].
We would be imprisoned within four walls. Here we can breathe. Thanks to
sohbets and [Islamist] party activities, we can always go out. I have visited so
many homes because of these activities.
Fatma also said that she started going out more after she became politically
involved. Religious activism confers on women the right to get out, associate with
others (even with those outside family networks) and organize, without leading them
to question the overall spatial structures that constrain their actions.
The Islamic reorganization of space in this district casts a doubt on conceptual
separations between identity-creation and strategy, and culture and structure. The
specific architectural layout forged by Islamic mobilization is a part of identity
formation, but (as in the case of many female activists) it also serves as a resource
for further mobilization. Moreover, while clearly a part of the Islamicized culture of
the district, the spatial patterns analyzed above also constitute a structure that both
enables and restricts action in multiple ways.
The division and re-organization of time
The regulation of everyday life necessarily involves the control of the rhythm of that
life. In Sultanbeyli, there is a naturalized flow of time that tends to naturalize the
hegemony of the Islamists and denaturalize the secularist state. We can take the
teahouses frequented by construction workers as an example. Construction workers
come to the teahouses early in the morning. They wander around the blocks
surrounding the teahouse. When a friend comes, they go back to the teahouse and
buy him a cup of tea. When bored, they go out and continue their conversation on
the pavement, by the wall. When they hear the call to prayer, they go to the mosque
in small groups. After the evening prayer, they return home. During the month of
fasting (Ramadan), they return at a later hour because they perform the additional
collective prayer (teravih) that is specific to that month and is later in the evening.
For construction workers, the time between the prayers is somewhat stressful
because they expect to hear about available work. During my time in the field, the
construction business in Turkey was undergoing a severe crisis, first because of a
major earthquake in 1999 that hit the sector specifically (due to tightened zoning
regulations), and then the nationwide financial crisis in 2001. So, most of the time,
the awaited calls were not forthcoming. When the hour of prayer arrived three or
four times a day (the other regular prayers were performed at home), workers usually
expressed relief. Dursun, a construction worker in his forties, captures how a
structured religious routine gave a rhythm to life and supplied them with something
to anticipate:
How can society be irreligious? There is a quake in beliefs during the last four-
five years. People are behaving weirdly and they are saying strange things.
They will either go mad or commit suicide, since they lack religion. ...
Unemployment is everywhere. We sit here [at the teahouse] for hours, in vain.
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... Religion gives a direction to people. It teaches us not to spend our time in
vain. But when this direction-giving religion strengthens, they block it!
This account demonstrates the structuring dimension of religion, that ordering and
unifying characteristic that, as Emile Durkheim (1915) noted, makes society possible
and saves people from purposelessness and isolation. However, this excerpt also
draws our attention to what was absent from religion in Durkheim’s theory—the
element of hegemony—by emphasizing the role of actors who fight against religious
activism (“they,” the secularist generals who implemented an anti-Islamist coup in
1997). Also buried in this account, buried under the pronoun “it,” is the other side of
the hegemonic equation: the actors whom the secularist generals blocked, those who
“strengthen” religion—the Islamists. Islamists naturalized their power over workers
like Dursun by giving a purpose and direction to their lives through building an
alternative routine.
Society is structured, but this structuring is hegemonic rather than mechanical:
there are interested actors who structure society in certain ways. In Sultanbeyli, these
are the religious specialists (imams and instructors of religious schools) and the
Islamists. These actors are active in mosques, teahouses, workplaces, and party
headquarters, telling people to abide by the prayer times and not to miss any prayers,
or actually monitoring them to make sure that they pray regularly.38 This is not all.
As Islamists come to hold positions of power, this hegemonic regulation of everyday
practices (and the flow of time) is even more structured, consensual, and
consecrated, as can be seen in the case of municipal practices.
In the municipality of Sultanbeyli, the daily prayer was an inseparable part of life.
Almost everybody took regular breaks to perform their prayers. More, the Islamist
administrators asked the workers whether they had already prayed before giving
them tasks, especially if these involved going to far away places. Workers of the
municipality approvingly said that this would be impossible in other official
workplaces. What religious scholars and Islamists propagate as duty elsewhere, had
become a right here: prayer times constituted seemingly natural (or “divine”) limits
to the authority of the administrators, limits that softened the tone of their orders.
Where praying regularly had become naturalized, Islamists could just lean against that
naturalization to establish their hegemony, rather than blatantly imposing their
worldview. In the case of the local municipality, at least, the hegemonic identity work
of Islamism had born its political fruits: a major institution regulated people’s lives in an
Islamic way. Targeting everyday life had started to reverberate up to the state.
The residents desired to see regulation of time on a broader scale. Some of them
wanted religious time to be enforced nationally. After the noon prayer one day, I
joined a conversation between construction workers. One of them, who had worked
for four and a half years in Saudi Arabia, praised the Saudi system:
They have a beautiful country. The Fridays are holidays. You cannot do any
business on a Friday. More, when the call to prayer is heard on any other day,
you have to quit all work. If you don’t, they take you to the police station. But
you do not have to pray. If you want, you can sit in a corner. Yet, until
38 This is the element of “mutual surveillance” that Philip Gorski (2003) has shown to be central to other
types of religious insurgency as well, such as Calvinism.
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everybody finishes the prayer, working is forbidden. And look at our country:
here, they would fire a man who performs his prayers!
Even though this characterization of the Saudi and Turkish regimes was not
completely accurate, the other workers nodded approvingly, affirming the political
perspective conveyed through this depiction. Some of the construction workers of
the district had likewise worked in Saudi Arabia for Turkish or other firms. They
also propagated similar views in Sultanbeyli. However, no legal organization in the
district could voice this outlook openly, since defending an Islamic state or the
application of Islamic law is illegal in Turkey. Despite this barrier, Islamists
reproduced the desire for state power mostly through informal talk in teahouses and
other venues.
Hence, Islamist mobilization is not simply about taking to the street, but
constituting the actors. Time is one of the elements that are constitutive of actors,
and Islamists (along with licensed religious specialists) reorganize time in everyday
life. But its reorganization, this reshuffling of identity, also fosters desires for
political power, urging us to go beyond any simple dichotomy between state and
society, politics proper and identity politics. This is precisely so because it is only
through state control that the practices structured by the Islamist movement can be
decisively naturalized.
Islamism’s long walk through institutions
The mobilization studied above is mostly concentrated in the capillaries of “society,”
even though it extends to the state. Yet, the Islamist impact on everyday life also
manifests itself at the more institutional level, affecting the molecular workings of
official and unofficial mosques, municipal and other public offices. This osmosis of
the informal into the formal calls into question the categorical opposition between
social movements that organize through formal channels and those that mobilize
through informal networks and shared meanings (Melucci 1989; Wiktorowicz
2001).39
Uses of the mosque
The mosque is of one the central foci of the struggle over meanings and practices in
Turkey. The state uses it to propagate secularist and nationalist messages. Indeed, the
central authorities take special care to ensure that the Friday sermons transmit
nationalist messages and modernist interpretations of Islam to the mosque
39 This binary opposition has a convoluted history in social movement studies. Tilly (1978) and others first
emphasized associational and rationally organized forms of collective action that emerged in the
nineteenth century (and differed from the informal gatherings of premodern mobilization) as a reaction to
collective behavior theorists who focused on “irrational” crowd behavior (though Blumer, Smelser, and
Turner and Killian had also studied the ultimate institutionalization of such behavior). Later social
movement scholars brought informal networks back in without implying that they are irrational, but they
also retained a binary opposition between informal and formal mobilization.
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communities in a way that will “resonate” (Snow and Benford 1988) with their
universe of affection and discourse. Friday sermons are also sites of contestation in
troubled times, making them central to the reproduction of secularist hegemony.
A clear example of this was the Friday sermon given in the central mosque of
Sultanbeyli during the days of the anti-US protests all over Turkey, which followed
the bombings of Afghanistan. Eight minibuses, a municipality bus, and two panzers
full of armed policemen were waiting in front of the central mosque. The imam’s
sermon was meant to calm down the community, which had been infuriated by the
military operation:
Wars have occurred in the time of the Prophet, they have occurred after him.
They will occur after us. The thing for the Muslim to do is to pray for those
who experience zulüm [undeserved violence or oppression] in war. Nothing
will happen by shouting and screaming.
He uttered these sentences in a soft, paternalist tone, as if a teacher talking to idle
students, as if sure of the affect they would produce. The crowd did not cause much
trouble to the police after the sermon. The imam’s words infuriated radical Islamists
listening to the sermon, or who heard about it afterwards. But there was nothing they
could do to counterbalance the power of the central mosque’s imam. Such uses of
the mosque block incipient Islamist mobilization and reinstate secularist power: they
naturalize the existing state of affairs and reproduce obedience to the state.
On the other hand, central mosques have to compromise once in a while, in order
to retain their crowds. One of the surest ways of managing discontent is letting the
representatives of seemingly oppositional groups talk in Friday sermons. The leader
of the Süleymancı community of Sultanbeyli used this political space to attack the
interventions of the local governor during a Friday sermon in 2000:
The local governor brags: “I haven’t left one person walking on the streets of
Sultanbeyli with turban, cüppe [traditional robe], or şalvar [traditional baggy
trousers]. I have left only two Qur’an schools, and closed down the rest.”What
kind of a sense of duty is this? … This man has come to power with your vote
[implying the nationalist parties who have appointed the local governor]. You,
who have come here for prayer, have brought to duty a man who doesn’t
prostrate before God. God will summon you on dooms day and ask, “Account
for it! Why have you brought the enemy of religion to the top?”
The guest imam, the leader of the Süleymancı community (one of the most
powerful Islamic groups in Turkey), attacks the appointed local governor because of
his policies that have targeted Islamic education and Islamic dress. He establishes a
direct relation between voting and doomsday, the state and religion, and suggests
that the community not vote for nationalist parties.40 He also implies that only
religious men are fit for posts such as the local governor.
40 I have used the label “seemingly oppositional” for this community, since its stance with regard to the
state is complex and appearances might be misleading. For example, one irony regarding this sermon was
the community’s reported electoral support for one of the parties that came to power after the elections in
1999. Moreover, an exclusively oppositional group would not be given a similar voice in official mosques.
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The sermons of the central mosque’s imam and this guest imam reveal one
dimension of religious mobilization (and demobilization). This is the level at which
religion is consciously and explicitly political. Either the state uses it as an opiate to
soothe the moral indignation of the people, or the religious opposition uses it as a
resource for political mobilization against the power holders, as Morris’s (1984)
work suggested. In these examples, religion is instrumentally employed to produce
secular and Islamic power. Religion is indeed a strategic and instrumental “resource”
in some contexts.
The state targeted explicitly contentious uses of the mosque more than ever after
the coup on the 28th of February, 1997. While money was being collected almost
everyday in front of the mosques (for Qur’an schools, for construction of other
mosques, etc.), after the coup money collection was restricted officially to once
every two weeks. The permission of the Directorate of Religious Affairs was
required for money collection. Yet, these rules were broken in many mosques and
the community continued to contribute to religious activities. After 1997, the control
over Friday sermons was very tight. In districts such as Sultanbeyli, where the
imams of many mosques are community-employed rather than being appointed by
the state, such control was only partially fruitful. Non-Islamist Muslims paid
particular heed to going to Friday sermons in central mosques with official imams.
Yet, Islamists in central locations took great pains to go to mosques with
community-employed imams, when they had the time to walk or if they had cars.
Islamists took advantage of such “opportunities” to spread their version of religion.
Religion and its role in social movements (and official pressure on movements) at
this (instrumentally strategic) level can be analyzed with the tools provided by
political process theories (though an NSM scholar could reasonably argue that there
are non-instrumental identity issues involved even in these examples).
However, this is only part of the story. The battle over religion is not only a fight
about controlling a valuable resource, but also about regulating the structuring
principles of everyday life. Religious hegemony involves the power to naturalize (or
denaturalize) certain social arrangements, which brings together with it the
naturalization of certain power relations. Consequently, it would be wise to look
not only at whether and how imams espouse certain parties and organizations (rather
than the secular state), but at how they naturalize or denaturalize social relations such
as the places of men and women in urban life.
Even many appointed imams frequently focused on the separation of the sexes.
For instance, during one Friday sermon, the officially appointed imam of one of the
larger mosques of the district preached as follows:
Believers! Do not enter the homes of women the husbands of whom are not
home. Do not create any situation which can invite adultery. Make sure your
women cover themselves. But do not forget that you should also cover your
eyes [avoid looking at women]. [Moreover,] covering is not the duty of only
women. Therefore the reverse is also true: you should also take care to cover
certain parts of your body and women should cover their eyes. ... The state is
not fulfilling its duty. For example, in high schools, girls and boys sit next to
each other! This is an invitation to sin. So at least you, believers, should do
what you can do and pay attention to your covering.
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Sermons such as this one, quite frequent in the mosques of Sultanbeyli, brought
about at one and the same time the denaturalization of the spatial arrangements of
the official education system (and of the city at large), naturalization of Islamic
arrangements and clothing, naturalization of Muslim men’s control over Muslim
women’s bodies, and redefinition of the role of the state. The state’s duty was
redefined as enforcing the separation of the sexes. By implication, the secular state,
which did not enforce it, was declared illegitimate. Also by implication, a complete
and proper organization of everyday life required a re-organization of the state.
These intertwined mechanisms exemplify the reconstitution of hegemony: the
reorganization of power through the denaturalization of established everyday life
patterns and the formation of an alternative everyday routine.
This regulation of everyday life was starker in mosques with unofficial imams.
Fikret, the radical estate dealer, was among those residents who were quite
dissatisfied with the imam of the central mosque. He and his friends frequently
went to the alternative mosques of the district to support unofficial religious
venues. One Friday, he invited me to go to one of these mosques, telling me “we
would gain more sevap [merit].” We joined his business partner and a recent
theology graduate (connected to them through a Qur’an study group) and went to a
mosque in one of Sultanbeyli’s remote neighborhoods. It was quite crowded.
Because of the density, people were stepping on each other’s feet, a situation one
would encounter only twice a year in regular mosques (during the bayram/eid
prayers, which are performed on religious holidays). It was so packed that people
could hardly pray. The mosque itself was still under construction, and it was
surprising to see so many people willing to be there under these abject conditions.
As seen below, the community-employed imams give somewhat different
messages from appointed imams not only politically but also at the everyday
level. The imam (a Kurdish man with a long beard) was quite strict. He preached in
a shouting tone:
The state is trying to instill a humanist religion under the guise of Islam. It is
asking us to respect non-believers, whereas we shouldn’t respect them.…
Muslims forgot shariah, and they are employing stark naked women [women
with miniskirts and sleeveless blouses] in order to attract customers. But, there
is no need to be friends or do business with unbeliever customers [mümin
olmayanlar, who would presumably be attracted by these women].... Muslims
should Islamize their surroundings. Islam is not a religion that can be closed
within the conscience; it has to organize life—in the workplace, in the
apartment building, in employing people.
The secular state’s rationale in not permitting imams to write their own
sermons lies precisely in this propensity of many prayer leaders to naturalize a
social order that is fundamentally at odds with the one the state naturalizes. Both
the Islamist attendants of this mosque and the state actors who are trying to
control these sermons perceive such sermons (and also the act of attending them)
to be subversive of the state, even when they do not touch matters that have to
do with the central government or its policy decisions. That is because these
sermons spread an interpretation of Islam that hegemonically reorders life at all
levels (respect of others, clothing, business choices, friendship, social responsi-
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bilities, etc.) and reinforces leadership by religious guides as an alternative to
domination by secular officials.
I have looked at two kinds of uses of the mosque in this section. The first is
openly political. The state and Islamists use the sermons to give political messages,
to demobilize or mobilize the population. Yet, even these more “political”
proclamations also (re)produce “meaning” and everyday practices: depending on
the mosque and preacher, they naturalize war, certain types of clothing, expectations
of piety from the rulers, etc. This intermeshing of naturalization with the openly
political is what establishes hegemony. The mobilization in the second type of use is
more subtle and less perceptible, but no less real. The second use is formative of
actors through the regulation of everyday life. As seen above, this regulation is
tighter in the mosques controlled and frequented by Islamists. Here we see that
Islamists mobilize not in the sense of taking to the streets, but in a “subterranean
politics” of frequenting mosques where social life is structured in the Islamist
direction, and drawing people to these mosques. However, even this attempted
regulation of everyday life is not only about “society” as separate from the state: it
calls for the restructuring of the state and its policies as well.
My findings are in accordance with Saba Mahmood’s study of Islamic
mobilization in Egypt. Mahmood (2005) argues that everyday life is deeply
politicized in the modern Middle East, and any transformation on this terrain incites
political intervention. She points out, for example, that it would be wrong to take
women involved in the Egyptian “mosque movement” (a grass-roots piety
movement) at their word and believe that this is a non-political movement. As
everyday life has been deeply politicized, their conduct interferes with the secular-
liberal project of the state. Therefore the state has either regulated the mosques
where the movement is active (nationalized them and required formal training) or
closed them down.
However, Mahmood’s differentiation between the “political Islamism” of the
parties and the religiosity of the mosque movement is too categorical. For instance,
according to Mahmood, whereas the former defends the veil (as a symbol) to build
an Islamic state, the latter defends it to create ethical conduct. Their difference in the
use of the veil extends to their deployment of every other Islamic symbol. But in
Turkey, the Islamist party, networks, and communities deployed Islam in both ways:
they struggled for an Islamic order, while at the same time regulating everyday lives.
There is a continuum rather than a sharp separation between the two types of
religious activity, I would argue.
Secular and religious officials: duty and piety
The connection between subterranean mobilization and the state is even clearer
when the practices of officials are involved. In Sultanbeyli, the everyday practices of
the municipal and governmental officials were the focus of public scrutiny. The
officials themselves were highly interested too in presenting the “correct” behaviors.
Zübeyir was one of the top officials of the Sultanbeyli municipality and an ardent
supporter of the Virtue Party. In his mid-forties, he was a graduate of one of the
prestigious theology schools. When I entered his room one day in Ramadan (the
fasting month of the Muslim calendar), a chanter was reciting the Qur’an on the radio.
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Zübeyir was following the chant by going over the lines of a Qur’an in Arabic script
with his fingers and eyes. After I reciprocated his greeting, I told him I could come
later, as I did not want to disturb the ritual. Reading the Qur’an (especially in the
original Arabic) has great sevap (merit) in Islam, but it brings more sevap during the
Ramadan. Finishing the whole book once (hatim indirmek) during this month is
considered to be an even greater sevap. Following radio and television programs that
air chanters during Ramadan is an opportunity to gain this sevap. “No, it’s almost
over,” he said, letting go of neither the merit nor a possible impact on social science.
As I was waiting for him, I took a look at the daily newspaper on his desk. The
headlines were about a case of fraud in one of the major banks of Turkey. In the last
decade, bank scandals had become a common occurrence in this country: top
officials of the secular state were frequently involved in illegally transferring the
funds of public banks to private parties, or “saving” bankrupt private banks by
legally transferring public funds to these banks, which had (the public suspicion
was) gone bankrupt on purpose to receive help from the state.
After the program was over, I said “I guess you are going to finish the whole
book in Ramadan.” Zübeyir responded: “One has to perform good deeds. [Pointing
at the newspaper] Look at those men. They are pillaging the banks!” An official in
the municipality thus counterposed his ritualistic practice to the practice of other,
secular officials who spend their times performing or helping fraud. The implication
was that if people who carry out “good deeds” (amel-us salihati, a Qur’anic phrase)
controlled the state, there would be less corruption. This belief was frequently
mentioned in teahouses and other informal conversations or, as here, implicitly
reproduced. This opposition between the righteous and the corrupt also justifies the
use of public office and the working hours of the day for religious purposes (to
which the secularists in Turkey are opposed and which they see as preparation for
the Islamist usurpation of the state). Again, the differences in the flow of daily life
are manipulated to reproduce the distinctions between the religious and the secular,
“us” and “them,” and imply the need for a different political regime and society. In
short, the way Islamists give meaning to basic rituals goes beyond piety and is
interwoven with the reconstruction of hegemony: the naturalization of an alternative
set of power holders who should ideally replace the existing ones.
These implicit or non-public challenges to secular officials sometimes become
explicit and public. The central government in Ankara had recently removed one of
the former imams of the central mosque in Sultanbeyli from his duty. There were
several speculations about the reasons of this action. Given the officially delicate
nature of the issue, it was not possible to determine with certitude the actual
motivation behind it. However, one of the commonly told stories went as follows.
This former imam, himself appointed by the central government, criticized the local
governor quite frequently because of his secularist policies. The local governor first
warned and then threatened him. The imam responded by saying “I am only
propagating Islam; I am not doing anything else. We are not afraid of anybody but
God.” The residents of the district reported that this imam also gave one decisive
speech during a funeral. He allegedly said:
I might be the state’s imam here, but I wouldn’t lead the funeral prayer of an
irreligious man. I am making the call to the prayer five times a day. If a man
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does not come even once, why should I lead his funeral prayer? Why should I
lead the funeral prayer of a man who doesn’t go to the Friday prayer even once
a month? Sons and nephews of deceased people bring them and tell me they
were Muslims, so I lead their funeral prayers. It is their sin if they are lying.
But if I actually know that the man is not a [practicing] Muslim, I would not
lead the prayer.
These residents interpreted this speech as a threat against the local governor, who
did not go to the mosque. The imam was implying that he would not lead the local
governor’s funeral prayer. “This was a speech against the state,” these residents said,
suggesting that not only the person of the local governor, but the regime he
represented was put into question by the speech. These stories were circulated
especially by construction workers in teahouses. The better off of the district,
especially those who wanted peaceful relations between the residents and the local
government, between religion and state, said that the imam wanted to go somewhere
else and the central government only helped him! Another argument was that he had
retired and then left the district. While I could not verify any one of these three
stories, what is significant in terms of the argument being made here is that the
construction workers who sympathized with Islamism saw a direct relation between
everyday religious observance and the legitimacy of an official’s rule over them.
These stories not only put pressure on the officials of the district to be more
observant, they also envisioned an ideal order where only certain people with certain
daily routines would be able to become officials. They thus reinforced Islamist
hegemony by defining the ideal daily conduct of rulers, as well as of regular
Muslims (a person is not worthy of a funeral ceremony if he does not pray). Just as
targeting everyday life reverberated up to the state in some of the examples above,
targeting the state reverberated down to society in this case.
Conclusion
Through the de-naturalization of secular life and traditional Islam and the attempted
naturalization of an alternative understanding of religion, Islamists had transformed
teahouses and municipalities by the summer of 2002, and spread unofficial mosques
throughout remote neighborhoods. The movement had not yet re-created local
governments and other state institutions as it pleased, but it instilled in ordinary
citizens the desire to see pious rulers.41 These changes did not come about through
street action, strikes, and petitions, but as a result of silent movement work on
everyday practices.
41 In 2007, five years after this research was completed, tensions over whether Turkey could have a pious
president plunged the country into a deep crisis. The conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government put forth a practicing Muslim as its presidential candidate and Islamist intellectuals (as well as
the speaker of the parliament) argued that from now on Turkey would have only pious presidents. The
secularist military used both moves as an excuse to intervene in politics and call for early elections. The
AKP government emerged out of the elections as a stronger party and had its practicing candidate elected.
Theor Soc (2009) 38:423–458 451
The practice of Islamism in Sultanbeyli demonstrates that some social movements
cannot be properly understood unless their identity work (not only on notions of
“us,” but also on alternative daily practices) and their relation to the properly
political realm are handled as inseparable parts of a larger hegemonic project.
Islamists use Islam as a guide in economic and religious life, and believe that this
conduct will lead to a specific type of state (but the development of this conduct also
depends on the state, as these actors recognize). This case exemplifies how daily
conduct can be part and parcel of political struggles.
As the conversations and routines of Islamists in Sultanbeyli also demonstrate,
social movements are structured and their subjects constituted not only in
organizations and on the street, but also through countless everyday interactions
that shape the daily conduct of participants. This constitution challenges the
boundaries between society and state, identity and strategy, culture and structure.
Islamists see developing their lifestyle (praying, fasting, behaving modestly, and
being frugal) not only as developing a politics of identity disengaged from the state
and from properly political realities, but as a struggle against imperialism. Islamist
interventions produce an Islamic architectural structure, which is one of the cultural
goals of the movement. Yet, this architectural structure further structures Islamic
mobilization. Islamists also naturalize an alternative order of things by reorganizing
time in people’s lives, especially around prayer times. The reorganization of time
and daily activities, though seemingly “social” only, involves the hand of the state
(and other major political institutions like municipalities), since actors are aware that
institutional reordering of time is necessary for a durable reorganization of life (e.g.,
for a sustained reorganization of everyday activities around prayer times). The case
of Islamism in Turkey should thus make us rethink the theoretical separations that
are made in the social movement literature.
The boundaries between society and state are blurred not only at the everyday
level, but also at the level of institutions. In Sultanbeyli, mosques are used as
resources for Islamist mobilization, just like churches were among the key resources
in the civil rights movement in the United States. However, the mosque is not only a
“resource” for Islamism; it is a primary site for the construction of Islamism as a
movement and the production of Islamist subjects. Islamists in this district use the
mosques to denaturalize the secular life instituted by the republic and to naturalize an
emergent Islamic lifestyle, which they think should also be reinforced by the state. If
religious institutions have an identity component as well as their bureaucratic and
resource functions, so do political offices. The goal of the Islamist movement is the
production of subjects who will have different daily conducts, different rituals, and
therefore different “internalized political programs” (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 424–426)
than the secularist officials. The Islamist residents of the district share this vision
with the Islamist administrators and believe that only practicing people are really fit
to rule. Hence, the creation of an Islamist identity in Sultanbeyli is not separate from
envisioning a different state. These observations suggest that social movement
studies can benefit from focusing on how institutions constitute actors and how the
reorganization of their daily life acts back upon the state.
The case at hand might imply that the intermeshing of the political and the
everyday is specific to Islamic movements. Nevertheless, an exchange between
Michael Young (2002) and Charles Tilly (2002) demonstrates that it might be
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problematic to pigeonhole movements into state-oriented and society-oriented even
in the paradigmatic case of the United States.42 This instructive debate is somewhat
derailed by the participants’ insistence on deciding whether nineteenth-century
temperance and anti-slavery movements primarily targeted the state or society. I
suggest that we would have a more productive way of looking at these movements
as constitutions of hegemony in the United States, with the understanding that
hegemonic moves might shift their focus to the individual, society or state depending
upon circumstances and the social context.43 In this vein, one could argue that these
movements’ provisional concentration on conquering society, which Young so
elegantly depicts, was but a war of position that foreshadowed the war(s) of
movement to come.44 Currently, the United States might be experiencing a similar
movement that simultaneously targets state and society through working on
everyday life—the new Christian Right.
Drawing on Habermas’s and Touraine’s work, Cohen (1985, pp. 668–669, 708–
709) has argued that the main contribution of the Western New Left in the 1960s was
to focus mostly on everyday life and civil society. But she adds that this was wedded
to an old Marxist, revolutionary desire for total rupture with bourgeois society. New
social movements, she concludes, have come to themselves by shedding away this
final “totalizing” desire. Movements that both transformed everyday life and targeted
the state were brief parentheses in the history of social movements; they were
precursors of the total transition to non-state-oriented movements, it would seem.
However, recent developments—ranging from the rise of Islamic movements to that
of the Christian Right—demonstrate that even though the Western left may have
abandoned this ground, new forces all over the globe have claimed it. These
developments may suggest that movements that simultaneously target the state and
everyday life are endemic to modernity rather than momentary lapses of reason.
To use that metaphor from the North American political scene once again,
Islamists both march on the “White House” and take over the “English
Department.” They both aim to hold governmental power and to shape people’s
daily lives and identity. Islamists, in their practice if not in their discourse, do
not oppose identity politics to politics proper. Is there a good reason why social
scientists should?
42 Also see Javier Auyero (2003), Georgi Derluguian (2005), Davis (1999), and Raka Ray (1999) for
movements that problematize the state/society distinction in contexts as varied as Latin America, South
Asia, and the Caucusus.
43 Actually, long before this debate took place, Mary Bernstein (1997) had pointed out that gay and
lesbian movements in the United States shifted from emphasizing identity to targeting the state depending
upon the moves of the state and the anti-gay opposition. While my findings tend to be parallel to
Bernstein’s, in that we both emphasize the context-dependence of state- or society-orientation of
movements, I focus more on everyday practices, their mechanisms, and the internal dynamics of the
identity field, whereas Bernstein seems ultimately to reduce the dynamics of identity to political context.
It should also be noted that even though the gay and lesbian movements in the United States might target
both society and state at times, they mostly do not seek to establish hegemony in the wider society.
44 This conceptual distinction comes from Gramsci (1971) who pointed out that transformative politics in
countries with strong intermediary institutions have to fight for controlling civil society (“war of position”)
before attempting to capture state power or shape state policy (“war of movement”).
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